Mind, Language and Intentionality
This book proposes to examine John Searle's philosophy of mind namely biological naturalism. Biological naturalism advocates two important points. First, the mind has evolved like any other biological phenomenon. Hence, the mind is part of the nature. Secondly, the mind is irreducible to the physical functions of the body. Therefore, the mind is independent of the nature. Dualism follows from the latter, whereas the former tries to make a case for a naturalistic inquiry of the mind. This poses ambivalence in the reader's mind. Some of Searle's critics like Daniel Dennett, Jerry Fodor, Ruth Millikan, J. N. Mohanty, Brain Loar, Collin McGinn, and many others are discussed to study the contemporary debates in philosophy of mind and have a comprehensive understanding of Searle's philosophy of mind. The discussion in this book is centered around the above-cited points and analysis has been developed reflecting on three important concepts namely mind, language, and intentionality. They are intrinsic to human life. Their intrinsicness is shown in their construal of experience, meaning, and action. The deepness of human conscious life is not measurable but rather can be experienced within the realm of the human form of life. Thus the present essay is a critique of Searle's theorization of the mind.